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Abstract
We compare the momentum returns to the return distribution of the zero-net-worth
strategies of uninformed \naive" individual investors in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Korea.
The high stock ownership and high proportion of trading volume from individual investors
in these economies make it an ideal setting to use the score function proposed by Banerjee
and Hung (BH, 2011). As in BH we nd that the average scores of the momentum prots in
these emerging markets are close to zero and statistically insignicant. In contrast to BH's
nding that in the U.S. market the winner stocks get signicantly positive scores, we nd
that in all the three markets the scores of the winner portfolio are statistically insignicant.
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1. Introduction
In this paper we conduct a close scrutiny on the relative performance of momentum strategies
and individual investors' strategies in the stock markets in Taiwan, Hong Kong and South
Korea.1 These economies are particularly interesting because individual investors play a
signicant role in these stock markets. First, domestic individual investors' stock ownership
in Taiwan is very high compared to the ownership of domestic nancial institutions (40.37%
versus 4.99% in 2011 according to the Taiwan Stock Exchange). In Hong Kong the stock
ownership number (2,035,000 individuals) and percentage (33.8%) of the adult population
reached their highest level in 2011, having been increasing since 1989 when the survey started
(see, Retail Investor Survey 2011 published by the Hong Kong Stock Exchange).
Second, in Taiwan the trading conducted by individual investors as a proportion of the
total trading volume was 84.41% in 2001. Although it gradually decreases to 62.7% in 2011
(see, the Taiwan Stock Exchange), this gure is still signicantly higher than the 14.4% of
volume traded by individuals in the U.S. as of 2001 reported by Grin et al. (2003). In
Hong Kong retail stock investors represent 35.7% of the adult population in 2011. Retail
investors contributed 22% to total market turnover in 2012-2013, with retail online trading
accounted for 39% of total retail investor trading (see, Cash Market Transaction Survey
2012/13). Likewise, in Korea individual investors' trading activity accounts for 79.5% of
total share trading volume (see, the Korea Stock Exchange) .
Most notably, the overwhelmingly important role of individual investors in these markets
1Jegadeesh and Titman (1993 and 2001) show the protability of the momentum strategies that are long
in the winners and short in the losers stocks. Many papers have examined the protability of momentum
strategies in countries other than the U.S. (e.g., Rouwenhorst, 1998; Chordia and Shivakumar, 2002; and
Grin, Ji and Martin, 2003).
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has led to investigations and controversies over individuals' trading performance relative to
professional asset managers. This is because the nancial literature often thinks of individual
investors as uninformed traders, while views institutional asset managers as informed traders.
One of the most prominent debates is on the protability of momentum strategies in these
Asian countries (see, e.g., Hameed and Kusnadi, 2002; Fu and Wood, 2010; Wang, Huang
and Lin, 2010; Chui, Titman, and Wei, 2010; Cheng and Wu, 2010, among others). Chui,
Titman, and Wei (2010) argue that individualism reects overcondence and document that
momentum prots are positively related to individualism. For example, in Taiwan where
individualism is low (Hofstede's individualism index (HII) score of 17) momentum prots are
insignicant, whereas in the U.S. (HII score of 91) where individualism is high momentum
prots are signicant. In contrast, Barber, Lee, Liu and Odean (2009) argue that the
majority of individual investors in Taiwan place aggressive orders, and report that '... all
individual trading losses can be traced to their aggressive orders'.
Our aim is to investigate the relative performance of the momentum investors (MI, here-
after), a particular type of professional or institutional asset managers, and the \naive"
individual investors (NI, hereafter) in the stock markets in these three economies. Indi-
vidual investors are diverse in their own investing instincts or decision rules, resulting in a
wide spectrum of their portfolio returns. The large proportion of individual traders in these
markets gives us an ideal experimental environment for our setting of the naive individual
investors.
We adopt the score function approach developed by Banerjee and Hung (2011) (BH,
hereafter) who demonstrate that the risk-based approach requires a correctly specied asset-
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pricing model. They argue that the estimated alpha inevitably has an omitted variable bias
if a \true" factor is omitted in a model. BH (2011) demonstrate that the scores of the risk-
adjusted return and the raw return are the same. This is very important because the use of
the score function does not require the identication of the source of risk and the estimation
of factor loadings.2
A researcher or an asset management company can directly use the score function to
reward or penalize a strategy for performance evaluation. In addition, the score function is
robust against return outliers, which is useful when there are extreme return values. Further,
an overall increase or decrease in asset returns or a jump in volatility does not aect the
score of a strategy. Thus, the momentum strategies do not receive rewards when everyone
else in the market does as well; likewise, they are not punished during a period of an overall
market crash.
We perform a t-test of the average of the sample scores to examine whether the average
scores of the momentum strategies and momentum decile portfolios are signicantly posi-
tive. We nd that in all the three stock markets the momentum prots from buying the
winners and selling short the losers receive an average score close to zero. These results are
similar to BH's nding that the momentum strategies in the U.S. do not generate better
performance than the NI's strategies because the average scores of momentum prots are
close to zero. Note that as the scores are not linearly additive, one cannot obtain the score
2Many nancial economists take the risk-based approach to analyze momentum and show that mo-
mentum prots remain signicant in a risk-adjusted sense (e.g., Grundy and Martin, 2001; Johnson, 2002;
Avramov and Chordia, 2006; Sagi and Seasholes, 2007). Other studies investigate momentum prots after
transaction costs (Lesmond, Schill and Zhou, 2004; Korajczyk and Sadka, 2004) or consider liquidity (Sadka,
2006). The theory and empirical evidence from behavioral approach advocate that the deviations from ratio-
nal behavior can result in momentum (e.g., Chan, Jegadeesh and Lakonishok, 1996; Hong and Stein, 1999;
Grinblatta and Han, 2005; Hvidkjaer, 2006).
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of the momentum prot by subtracting the losers' score from the winners' score.
We show (in Figures 4 and 6) that the prots of momentum strategies in all the three
markets have large dispersions, and either go higher than the 80th percentile or drop below
the 20th percentile of the nave strategies prots. Thus, the momentum prots have either
the highest or the lowest scores at dierent points in time which oset each other over time.
In a sharp contrast to BH's nding for the U.S. markets where the winner stocks get
positive and signicant average scores, we nd that, in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea, none
of the momentum decile portfolios outperforms the naive strategies. In other words, although
aggressively chasing winners in the U.S. outperforms the NI's strategies, this is certainly not
the case in the three emerging markets. The average scores of all the decile portfolios are
statistically insignicant. This is because the return dierences between the decile portfolios
and the NIs' have high variability and are negative, on average. Thus, taking a long position
in each of the momentum decile portfolios (including the winner portfolio) nanced at the
risk-free rate receives a negative (insignicant) reward, on average.
For Taiwan we further consider a sub-sample period between January 1992 and December
2008. This choice of sub-sample analysis is not only motivated by the result of Lo and Ju
(2011) who document signicant momentum prots, but also because the Taiwan stock
market did not allow investment from foreign institutional investors until 1991 (see, Lin
and Chen, 2006). We nd that once foreign institutional investors enter into the market, the
economic and statistical signicance of the protability of the momentum strategies increase.
In term of the score of momentum relative to the distribution of naive investors, however,
it is zero and statistically insignicant, showing the same overall pattern of results with the
4
whole sample period.
Overall, we nd that the momentum strategist is no better than a simple "naive" ran-
domizer because the rewards and penalties cancel out over the long-run. Our ndings suggest
that the chance of the momentum long-short trading in these emerging stock markets for
beating the portfolios of the nave investors is only 50%. In other words, asset managers
who pursue the momentum strategies and charge fees on their investors do not outperform
the simple strategies of naive individual investors.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 denes the strategies of the
naive investors, and the score function. In Section 3 we detail our empirical methodology,
and in Section 4 we describe our sample and discuss the empirical tests. Section 5 presents
the results, and Section 6 concludes. The Appendix contains the necessary theorems for the
score function. The details of proofs are presented in BH (2011).
2. The strategies of naive individual investors and the score function
We use the construction of NI's and the score function to evaluate the momentum strategies
with the strategies of the naive individual investors. BH's (2011) approach rewards and
penalizes the momentum strategist who uses the past return information in the strategy
formation by comparing momentum returns to those of the "NIs" who use no information
and give weight to stocks randomly. An investor's portfolio strategy F is dened over the
feasible asset set A comprised of N stocks. The vector of returns in excess of the risk-free
rate on the feasible asset set is r, and the excess portfolio returns on strategy F is r0F.
The sophisticated momentum traders rst observe and analyze the information of past
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returns on the set of N stocks feasible for trading. The MI then forms the winner portfolio
FW (top 10% past returns), the loser portfolio FL (bottom 10% past returns), and constructs
the momentum strategies FP = (FW   FL) at period t; deriving a prot r0FP .
The naive individual investor (NI) in our construction adopts any possible long-only
strategies without using any information, and deploys a random vector of N dimensional
weight over the N   1 simplex. Notice that the winner and loser portfolios are also in this
N   1 simplex, i.e. that, FW and FL are two of the possible strategies of the NIs. Such
random allocations are random drawings from an uniform distribution over a simplex, and
do not necessarily give equal weights. Since the NI randomly chooses weights, the chance of
investing in only one asset is the same as the chance of splitting the investment to dierent
assets equally with weights.
Dening  as the random portfolio weight vector, in what follows the cumulative dis-
tribution of the NIs' strategy prots is G (qj r) = Pr (r0  qj r). We then generate the
percentiles qk of the prot distribution as G (qk j r) = kK ; k = 0; 1; ::; K: We simulate the
weights of the naive strategies using Theorem A1 (see, in Appendix reproduced from BH
(2011) who derive analytical expressions for the weights and give a method for generating
the random weight vector).
The NI liquidates the portfolio at the end of period t when stock returns r are realized,
and obtains portfolio return r0: Notice that the portfolio returns are random variables
because the portfolio weights are random variables. In the next period t+1 the NI uses the
same method to reform and hold a portfolio.
We use the score function to evaluate the excess portfolio returns r0F on a strategy F
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relative to the percentiles of the prot distribution of the NIs' strategies. Specically, as
shown in Figure1, we assign a reward of 2 units for the MI if the momentum prot is above
the 80th percentile of the return distribution of the NI; a reward of 1 unit if it is above the
60th percentile but below the 80th percentile. Likewise, we penalize the MI by awarding
negative rewards of -1 and -2, respectively, if the momentum prot falls below the 40th
percentile and the 20th percentile of the NI return distribution. We give a reward of zero
to the MI if the momentum prot falls between the 40th percentile and the 60th percentile.
The reward thus decreases with the quintiles. In general, the reward function does not have
to be a ve point function or even symmetric. Users can change the parameters of this
function. For illustration purpose, we display the score function below:
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The score function thus constructed is invariant under any common risk factors (see
Theorem A3 in the Appendix). In other words, the scores are the same for both the risk-
adjusted returns and raw returns. The score function thus allows us to avoid the identication
of risk factors, and base on raw returns for comparison.
3. Empirical methodology
We consider the long-only momentum decile portfolios (including the winner and the loser
portfolios) in addition to the long-short momentum strategies. In our context the NIs are
unsophisticated and do not fully understand the processes, costs and risks involving in short-
sales of stocks. Our construction of not involving the NI to sell short is consistent with the
widely documented nding that short-sales is very dicult because of the risks, costs, legal
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and institutional restrictions, and the need of sucient stock supply from investors who are
willing to lend (see, Jones and Lamont, 2002).3 In contrast to the MI, the NIs do not use past
price information to construct their portfolios. The NI forms a long position randomly using
the same feasible stock set as is available for the MI for forming the momentum strategies.
At the beginning of each month t the NI forms a random portfolio by choosing with
equal chances any positive or zero weight for each of the feasible stocks. The weights of
this portfolio, summing to unity, are thus a non-negative vector of random drawings from
an uniform distribution. The NI nances the investment in the stock portfolios through
borrowing at the risk-free rate (which we proxy using the Taiwan money market rate). The
initial position of the NI's strategy has zero net-worth with a long leg in the risky assets
and a short leg in the risk-free asset. Thus, the portfolio return of the NI in excess of the
risk-free rate is the prot of the naive individual investor's strategy.
We generate the portfolio weights using Monte Carlo method, and construct 1,000 port-
folios for the NIs in each month of our sample period, and hence obtain a cross-section of the
returns of the NIs at the end of period t. Therefore we get a probability distribution of the
returns of the NIs in each month, and thus get the return distributions of the NI throughout
our sample period.
In order to examine whether momentum traders outperform the \naive" individual in-
vestors, we compare the prots of momentum strategies that buy the winners and sell short
the losers to the quintiles of the return distribution of the simple strategies of the NIs. We
3Empirical nance research shows that the level of shares sold short in the stock market is generally very
low. In the U.S. stock market, for example, Dechow, Hutton, Meulbroek, and Sloan (2001) report that those
stocks having short interest greater than 5% of shares outstanding account for less than 2% of all stocks for
the 1976{1993 period. Similarly the median of the ratio of short interest over shares outstanding is 0.03 for
the period over 2006-2009 according to the Taiwan Economic Journal.
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use the BH's (2011) score function to assign rewards to the MI. In each period the MI gets
a reward from the set of f2, 1, 0, -1 or -2g. Over a period of T years the MI receives a
time-series of rewards.
We test whether the scores of momentum prots and the momentum decile portfolios are
signicantly higher than those of the NIs' strategies. By construction, the expected reward
of the NI is zero because of the fact that the score of the median of the NI's prots is always
zero, and that the rewards/penalties of the NI are uniformly distributed with a probability
of 1/5. Our hypothesis is that if the MI's strategy is better than the NI's strategy, then
he/she should, on average, get a positive reward for the eorts over this T year period.
4. Sample and empirical tests
We use the data of all stocks listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange collected from the
Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) for the period between January 1986 and December 2011.
We also use the monthly equity data of all stocks listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange
and on the Korea Stock Exchange for the period between January 1986 and December 201,
collected from Datastream. The interest rate data are collected from the IMF data base.
The interest rate data for Hong Kong goes back to 1993, for South Korea the earliest we
obtain is from 1991. We exclude all stocks with prices below NTD 5 at portfolio formation as
in Lo and Ju (2011). In order to enter the analysis, a stock must have at least six consecutive
monthly returns. Our nal sample consists of 803 stocks. We use all the stocks in case of
Hong Kong and Korea.
The sample stocks in these three markets dene our feasible asset set A. For each
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market, at the end of each month, the stocks within the top 10% of past returns comprise
the winner portfolio and stocks within the bottom 10% of past returns comprise the loser
portfolio. Our tests focus on the representative momentum strategies that form equally
weighted portfolios by sorting stocks on their past 6-month compounded returns and hold
portfolios for 6 months (6  6 momentum, hereafter) (see also, Chordia and Shivakumar,
2002; and Grin, Ji and Martin, 2003). We also analyse the 3-month by-3-month portfolio
formation (3 3 momentum, hereafter)4. We form equally weighted portfolios at the time
of formation and hold them without rebalancing during the holding period.5 For example,
the overlapping momentum strategies are comprised of six strategies with each starting one
month apart, as in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). The portfolio returns on the overlapping
strategies are the averages of the portfolio returns on the six strategies.
The scores in our empirical tests is increasing with the percentiles of prots. Specically,
we give scores from -2 to 2 in ascending order to the quintile intervals as in BH (2011). In
order to assign scores as in denition (Figure 1) to the momentum strategies, we generate
the cross-sectional distribution of excess portfolio returns of the NIs. Specically, in each
month, we construct a cross-section of excess returns of 5,000 portfolios for the NIs using the
result in Theorem (A1), and then obtain the quintile points of the excess return distribution.
For the purpose of illustration for the NIs' strategies, we use the stocks in our Taiwan
sample to plot Figure 2 which shows in box charts the prot distribution, each month, of the
4We thank the referee for the suggestion.
5We compute monthly excess portfolio returns and the prots to momentum strategies using single-
period returns. In the case when a stock is delisted during the holding period, the liquidating proceeds are
reinvested in the remaining stocks in the portfolio.
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NIs' strategies for the period 1992{2008 examined by Lo and Ju (2011). The top, middle
and bottom boxes display, respectively, the 60th to the 80th percentiles,the 40th to the 60th
percentiles, and the 20th to the 40th percentiles of the excess returns of the NIs strategies.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
We also use the stocks in our Taiwan sample to plot Figure 3 which displays the centered
box charts using the centered excess returns rc = r r1. We see immediately that, once the
excess returns are centered, the distribution of the centered returns is stable. This pattern is
important because the score function is also stable according to Corollary A4 that the score
of ane transformations of the excess returns remains the same, i.e., S (F : r) = S (F : rc).
[Insert Figure 3 here]
We evaluate the momentum strategies and the momentum decile portfolios using the
score function (A3) in our empirical tests. In one month a strategy or a portfolio receives
a score of 2, 1, or 0, respectively, if the prot or excess return goes higher than the 80th
percentile, falls within the 60th and the 80th percentiles, or falls within the 40th and the
60th percentiles of the excess return distribution of the NIs strategies. The negative scores
are given vice versa. We evaluate the score of the momentum strategies every month and
then calculate the average score, b (fFPt : rtg) during the T evaluation periods.6
We test whether the scores of momentum prots and the momentum decile portfolios are
signicantly higher than those of the NIs' strategies. Notice that the average score of the
strategy Ft is b (fFt : rtg) = 1T PTt=1 St (fFt : rtg), and that the mean of the average scores
6Banerjee and Hung (2011) give details for the statistical tests of the scores (their Appendix C).
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b (ft : rtg) is zero (E [b (ft : rtg)] = 0). The null hypothesis is H0 : E[S (FP : r)] = 0
against the alternative HA : E[S (FP : r)] > 0: We also run the test for each of the decile
portfolios:
5. Results
5.1. Taiwan
As discussed earlier, there are debates over the protability of the momentum strategies
in Taiwan. Hameed and Kusnadi (2002) use an early sample over 1979{1994 and nd that
the momentum prot is statistically insignicant. Table 1 reports the average excess returns
and scores of the momentum decile portfolios. Panel A shows for the 6  6 momentum
that, over the whole sample period 1986{2011, the winner (P10) portfolio has the highest
average excess return of 1.24% per month, while the loser portfolio (P1) gives the lowest
monthly average excess return of 0.53%, and the average momentum prot is 0.71%, albeit
statistically insignicant.
[Insert Table 1 here]
Lo and Ju (2011) document signicant momentum prot over 1992{2008. As presented
in Panel B, we nd similar results for the 6 6 momentum for the sub-sample period that
winner stocks have the highest average excess return of 1.09% per month; loser stocks lose,
on average, -0.27% per month in excess of the risk free rate. The momentum prot is, on
average, 1.04%, with a t-ratio of 1.86.
Importantly, the average score of the momentum prots is close to zero and statistically
insignicant over the whole sample period and the sub-sample period. The results of the
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scores show that the momentum strategies are not performing any better than the zero
net-worth strategies of the NIs. We also nd a striking pattern of the average scores of
all the decile portfolios { they are all negative albeit statistically insignicant, regardless of
examining the whole sample period or the sub-sample period. Put it dierently, investing
in any of the stock decile portfolios formed based on past return information only delivers
excess returns lower than the 40th percentile of the prot distribution of the naive investors'
strategies, on average.
Panels C and D of Table 1, for the whole sample period and the sub-sample period,
respectively, reports the results of the 3 3 momentum in Taiwan. Both panels show that
the excess returns of the winner and the loser portfolios are not signicantly dierent from
each other. Thus, the momentum prot is statistically insignicant, either over the whole
sample or the sub-sample period. The overall pattern of the results is consistent with the
ndings on the momentum eect in the Taiwan stock market.
Figure 4 gives more insights into the results presented in Table 1 by displaying the relative
frequencies of the scores for both the 6 6 and the 3 3 momentum strategies. As displayed
in Figure 4 the scores of the winner portfolio (in the rst column) and the loser portfolio (in
the second column) frequently locate at the extreme ends of either positive 2 or negative 2.
The winner portfolio, in particular, receives relatively more scores of negative 2 than scores
of positive 2. In other words, the winner portfolio has more than 50% chances of delivering
excess returns lower than the 20th percentile of the prot distribution of the naive investors'
strategies. This is slightly oset by the chances of delivering excess returns higher than the
80th percentile of the naive prots. The net outcome of the winner portfolio is thus negative.
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Recall that a negative score is an outcome of the excess portfolio return lower than the 40th
percentile of the prot distribution of the naive investors' strategies.
The scores of the prots (in the third column) of both the 6 6 and the 3 3 momentum
strategies tend to be at the extreme ends of either positive or negative 2, with close chances,
thereby osetting each other. Thus, the momentum prots receive an average score close to
zero, and statistically insignicant.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
In order to clearly illustrate the risky nature of the momentum prots we plot Figure
5 which displays the box charts for the centered 6  6 momentum prots rc (= r   r).7
This gure demonstrates that there are large prots and loses occurring at dierent points
in time, thereby receiving extreme ends of scores of either positive 2 or negative 2.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
The overall evidence in this section suggests that individual investors in Taiwan are
not better o by pursuing either a long / a short position on momentum investing or the
combined long-short momentum strategies. For example, selling short the loser portfolio
does not ensure a positive and statistically signicant average excess return, nor does it get
a positive and statistically signicant average score.
7
r0cFP = (r r1)0 (FW   FL) = r (FW   FL) since 10FW = 10FL = 1:
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5.2. Hong Kong
Table 2 reports the average excess returns and scores of the momentum decile portfolios
in Hong Kong. Panels A and B present results of the 6  6 momentum and the 3  3
momentum, respectively. The results from both strategies show that although the average
excess return on winner stocks is higher than that of the loser stocks, neither of them are
statistically signicant. The average prot from the 6  6 momentum is 0.95% per month
and statistically signicant at the 10% level. The average prot from the 3 3 momentum
is high at 1.28% per month (t = 2.75). The overall pattern of the results is consistent with
the ndings on the momentum eect in the Hong Kong stock market (e.g., Cheng and Wu,
2010; Chui, Titman, and Wei, 2010).
[Insert Table 2 here]
In terms of scores, however, we nd a consistent pattern with our ndings for Taiwan {
the average score of the momentum prots is essentially zero and statistically insignicant,
in either case of the 6 6 momentum or the 3 3 momentum. These result indicate that
the zero net-worth strategies of the NIs perform as well as the momentum strategies.
Panel A of Figure 6 for Hong Kong presents the relative frequencies of the scores. Similar
to what we reported for Taiwan, the momentum prots (in the third column) are more likely
to score either a positive 2 or a negative 2. Consequently, the momentum prots receive an
average score of zero. On the other hand, the winner portfolio and the loser portfolio often
score either a positive 2 or a negative 2. The loser portfolio, for example, receives relatively
more scores of negative 2 than scores of positive 2. As a result, the average score of the loser
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portfolio is negative.
[Insert Figure 6 here]
5.3. Korea
Panels C and D of Table 2 present, respectively, the average excess returns and scores
of the 6 6 momentum and the 3 3 momentum in Korea. Consistent with the literature
on the Korea stock market (e.g., Hameed and Kusnadi, 2002; Chui, Titman, and Wei, 2010),
our results show that the average excess return on the winner stocks are higher than that
on the loser stocks. The average momentum prot for both the 6  6 momentum and the
3 3 momentum are relatively low and statistically insignicant.
Similar to our ndings for Taiwan and Hong Kong, the average score of the momentum
prots as shown in Table 2 is virtually zero and statistically insignicant. For example, the
momentum prot from the 6 6 momentum has an average score of 0.0024 (t = 0.19). Once
again, these results indicate that the zero net-worth strategies of the NIs perform as well as
the momentum strategies.
Panel B of Figure 2 for Korea presents the relative frequencies of the scores for both the
6 6 momentum and the 3 3 momentum. Similar to what we reported for Taiwan and
Hong Kong, although the momentum prots are slightly more likely to score a positive 2
than a negative 2, the extreme scores oest each other, on average. Thus, the momentum
prots receive an average score of zero.
Table 2 also presents that the average excess returns of all the decile portfolios are
statistically insignicant. Interestingly, almost all of the momentum decile portfolios receive
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negative average scores, albeit statistically insignicant. These patterns show that investing
in any of the momentum decile portfolios does not only generate statistically insignicant
excess returns, but also does not outperform the naive investors' strategies.
6. Conclusions
The stock markets in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea share similar characteristic that
there are high stock ownership and high proportion of trading volume from individual in-
vestors. The large proportion of individual traders in these emerging markets gives us an
ideal experimental environment for our setting of the naive individual investors. The diver-
sity of individual investors' investing instincts and decision rules results in a wide spectrum
of their portfolio returns. These features make it an ideal setting to use the score function
proposed by Banerjee and Hung (2011) for evaluating momentum portfolio returns and the
protability of the momentum strategies. The score function is invariant under risk factor
models and thus does not require the specication for the risk factors underlying the mo-
mentum eect. As in Banerjee and Hung (2011), we give scores to the momentum strategies
that use past return information relative to the cross-section of the prot distribution of the
zero net-worth strategies of "naive individual investors" who do not use any information.
We consider the long-only momentum decile portfolios (including the winner and the
loser portfolios) in addition to the long-short momentum strategies. In a sharp contrast to
BH's nding that in the U.S. markets the winner stocks get positive and signicant average
scores, we nd that none of the momentum decile portfolios outperforms the naive strategies
in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea.
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Similar to BH's nding for the long-short momentum strategies in the U.S., we nd that
in all these three markets average scores of the momentum strategies are close to zero and
statistically insignicant. Our evidence suggests that, on average, the long-short momentum
strategies do not outperform the naive strategies. Furthermore, chasing the winners in any
of the three stock markets does not get positive average scores, either. Our ndings provide
important evidence on the protability of momentum strategies in these three economies,
and contribute to the prominent debate in this area of the literature.
From a practical point of view, the momentum trading requires costs of intensive trans-
actions to form overlapping positions, and of acquiring and analyzing return information.
Further, establishing the long-short strategy position involves taking additional risks and
costs as well as facing regulation restrictions on short sales of stocks. These necessary costs
and trading diculties do not help the momentum traders.
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7. Appendix:
For illustration purpose, we re-iterate the necessary theorems and denitions in Banerjee
and Hung (2011) below. Further details are presented in BH (2011).
Theorem A1 The joint distribution of the portfolio weights of the NI is uniform and is
given by  = (1; :::; i; :::; N) where the marginal distribution of the weight on stock i is
i =
EiP
Ei
, and Ei s iid ExponentialDist(1) such that the density of  is
h (w) = N !; if w 2 W+ (A) ;
= 0; otherwise
Corollary A1 The cross-sectional mean and the projection median, PM; of  are given by
E[] = PM () =
1
N
1 (A1)
where 1 is a vector of ones with length N .
Corollary A2 The variance-covariance matrix of  is
E[0] =  =
1
N (N + 1)

I  1
N
110

: (A2)
Corollary A3 The excess portfolio return from a naive strategy  is given by r0: Following
from (A1), the cross-sectional mean and the median of the excess portfolio returns of the NI
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strategies are
E[r0] =M (r0) =
1
N
NX
i=1
ri = r
Hence, r is eectively the equally weighted excess return of the feasible asset set. From (A2)
the variance of the excess portfolio returns of the NI strategies is
V ar (r0) =
1
N + 1
NX
i=1
(ri   r)2 :
Theorem A2 Let g be the density of the prots of the NIs' strategies such that G (qj r) =
qZ
 1
g (qj r) dz, where r is a vector of excess returns. We have:
g (qj r) =
NX
k=1
(rk   q)N 1
NY
l=1;l 6=k
(rl   rk)
Corollary A4 The score function is invariant under common ane transformation i.e., for
any  2 R+ and  2 R, the score of ane transformations of the excess returns remains the
same.
S (F : r+ 1) = S (F : r) :
Denition 1 We give a strategy F a score of sk or zero in the following way:
S (F : r) =
KX
k=1
skI [qk 1  r0F < qk] (A3)
where I has a value of 1 if r0F is between the percentiles qk 1 and qk such that G (qk j r) =
20
k
K
;and 0 otherwise.
Theorem A3 Let the excess return generating process be given by the factor model
rt = t +Btxt + "t; "t 
 
0; 2t INt

; t = 1; :::; T (A4)
where t is the vector of intercepts, Bt is the vector of factor loadings, x
0
ts are common risk
factors, 2t is the cross-sectional variance at time t and Nt is the total number of assets at
time t. Then for any strategy Ft 2 W (A) the score of the risk-adjusted return is the same
as that of the excess return,
S

Ft :
rt  Btx


= S (Ft : rt) ; t = 1; :::; T:
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Table 1 
Excess returns and scores of the momentum strategies in Taiwan 
This table presents excess portfolio returns and scores on the overlapping momentum strategies with 
ranking and holding periods of 6 months (in Panel A for the whole sample and Panel B for the sub-
sample) and 3 months (in Panel C and Panel D). The momentum portfolios are equally weighted. 
Winner is the top past-return decile, and Loser is the lowest past-return decile. “Profit” denotes the 
momentum profit from the zero net-worth strategy that is long Winner and short Loser. The asterisk 
of *, ** and *** denotes the significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A Taiwan: 6×6 momentum, whole sample 01-1986 to 12-2011 
 Loser 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Winner Profit 
Return 0.53% 0.87% 0.94% 0.95% 0.75% 0.91% 0.93% 0.81% 0.94% 1.24% 0.71% 
t-stat (0.68) (1.17) (1.31) (1.41) (1.15) (1.43) (1.44) (1.21) (1.29) (1.56) (1.48) 
Score -0.106 -0.039 -0.049 -0.056 -0.060 -0.034 -0.034 -0.044 -0.039 -0.029 0.037 
t-stat (-1.01) (-0.36) (-0.46) (-0.53) (-0.55) (-0.31) (-0.31) (-0.41) (-0.36) (-0.26) (0.32) 
Panel B Taiwan: 6×6 momentum, sub-sample 01-1992 to 03-2008 
Return -0.18% 0.22% 0.23% 0.29% 0.11% 0.30% 0.36% 0.31% 0.44% 0.86% 1.04% 
t-stat (-0.27) (0.36) (0.40) (0.50) (0.20) (0.55) (0.63) (0.53) (0.66) (1.09) (1.86) 
Score -0.109 -0.053 -0.045 -0.062 -0.057 -0.023 -0.013 -0.019 -0.034 -0.019 0.071 
t-stat (-0.85) (-0.41) (-0.34) (-0.47) (-0.42) (-0.16) (-0.10) (-0.14) (-0.25) (-0.13) (0.50) 
Panel C Taiwan: 3×3 momentum, whole sample 01-1986 to 12-2011 
Return 1.07% 0.78% 0.87% 0.85% 0.81% 0.96% 1.07% 0.96% 0.97% 0.93% -0.14% 
t-stat (1.32) (1.06) (1.30) (1.29) (1.26) (1.56) (1.67*) (1.45) (1.43) (1.32) (-0.28) 
Score -0.063 -0.072 -0.046 -0.063 -0.056 -0.028 -0.012 -0.028 -0.020 -0.053 0.016 
t-stat (-0.58) (-0.67) (-0.43) (-0.59) (-0.53) (-0.26) (-0.11) (-0.26) (-0.18) (-0.48) (0.14) 
Panel D Taiwan: 3×3 momentum, sub-sample 01-1992 to 03-2008 
Return 0.50% 0.42% 0.37% 0.29% 0.22% 0.37% 0.40% 0.35% 0.27% 0.57% 0.07% 
t-stat (0.65) (0.64) (0.62) (0.49) (0.39) (0.66) (0.71) (0.57) (0.45) (0.79) (0.12) 
Score 0.005 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.001 
t-stat (0.65) (0.64) (0.62) (0.49) (0.39) (0.66) (0.71) (0.57) (0.45) (0.79) (0.12) 
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Table 2 
Excess momentum returns and scores in Hong Kong and Korea 
This table presents excess portfolio returns and scores on the overlapping momentum strategies with 
ranking and holding periods of 6 months and 3 months. Panels A and B for Hong Kong show results 
of the 6×6 momentum and the 3×3 momentum, respectively. Panels C and Panel D for Korea show 
results of the 6×6 momentum and the 3×3 momentum, respectively. The momentum portfolios are 
equally weighted. Winner is the top past-return decile, and Loser is the lowest past-return decile. 
“Profit” denotes the momentum profit from the zero net-worth strategy that is long Winner and short 
Loser. The asterisk of *, ** and *** denotes the significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A Hong Kong: 6×6 momentum 01-1993 to 12-2011 
 Loser 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Winner Profit 
Return -0.07% 0.37% 0.60% 0.80% 0.72% 0.90% 1.04% 0.88% 0.92% 0.88% 0.95% 
t-stat (-0.09) (0.55) (0.95) (1.30) (1.24) (1.59) (1.85*) (1.56) (1.57) (1.27) (1.73*) 
Score -0.152 -0.101 -0.037 0.008 0.016 0.046 0.049 0.049 0.048 0.007 0.056 
t-stat (-1.29) (-0.83) (-0.29) (0.07) (0.13) (0.37) (0.40) (0.39) (0.38) (0.06) (0.42) 
Panel B Hong Kong: 3×3 momentum 01-1993 to 12-2011 
Return -0.27% 0.27% 0.48% 0.75% 0.68% 0.71% 0.78% 0.71% 0.80% 1.01% 1.28% 
t-stat (-0.37) (0.42) (0.78) (1.26) (1.18) (1.28) (1.35) (1.22) (1.33) (1.43) (2.75***) 
Score -0.141 -0.083 -0.050 -0.022 0.006 0.035 0.026 0.015 0.010 0.001 0.036 
t-stat (-1.20) (-0.67) (-0.41) (-0.18) (0.05) (0.28) (0.21) (0.12) (0.08) (0.01) (0.28) 
Panel C Korea: 6×6 momentum 01-1991 to 12-2011 
Return 0.51% 1.11% 0.96% 0.85% 0.88% 1.10% 1.23% 1.38% 0.82% 0.80% 0.29% 
t-stat (0.66) (1.52) (1.37) (1.29) (1.36) (1.70) (1.83) (1.99) (1.24) (1.17) (0.54) 
Score -0.083 -0.040 -0.050 -0.045 -0.057 -0.029 -0.012 0.002 -0.035 -0.006 0.024 
t-stat (-0.70) (-0.33) (-0.44) (-0.39) (-0.48) (-0.25) (-0.10) (0.01) (-0.29) (-0.05) (0.19) 
Panel D Korea: 3×3 momentum 01-1991 to 12-2011 
Return 0.14% 0.64% 0.57% 0.58% 0.49% 1.06% 0.95% 1.25% 1.04% 0.71% 0.57% 
t-stat (0.19) (1.01) (0.92) (0.91) (0.79) (1.67*) (1.46) (1.87*) (1.55) (1.00) (1.01) 
Score -0.081 -0.011 -0.034 -0.029 -0.065 -0.011 -0.022 -0.025 -0.012 -0.039 0.005 
t-stat (-0.70) (-0.10) (-0.29) (-0.25) (-0.57) (-0.10) (-0.18) (-0.21) (-0.10) (-0.33) (0.04) 
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Figure 1: The five-point score function 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The monthly profit (in %) distributions of the naive 
strategies from January 1992 to March-2008. The distributions are 
displayed in box charts. The bottom box shows the 20th to the 40th 
percentiles of the profits of the naive investors strategies; the green box in 
the middle displays the 40th to the 60th percentiles; and the top box 
displays the 60th to the 80th percentiles. 
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Figure 3: The centered monthly profit (in %) distributions of the 
naive investors strategies from January 1992 to March 2008. The 
distributions are centered by their medians and displayed in box charts. The 
bottom box shows the 20th to the 40th percentiles of the profits of the naive 
investors strategies; the green box in the middle displays the 40th to the 
60th percentiles; and the top box displays the 60th to the 80th percentiles. 
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Panel A six month-by-six month momentum 
 
Panel B three month-by-three month momentum 
 
 
Figure 4: Frequencies of momentum scores in Taiwan. The 
distributions of 5 scores of the winner (1st column), the loser (2nd 
column) portfolios and the momentum profits (3rd column). The 
first and second rows in each panel display the results, respectively, for the 
whole sample period and the sub-sample period 01-1992 to 03-2008.  
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Figure 5: Six month-by-six month momentum in Taiwan. The 
centered monthly return (in %) distributions of the momentum 
profits: January 1992 to March 2008 The distributions are centered by 
the median profits of the naive investors strategies and displayed in box 
charts. The bottom box shows the 20th to the 40th percentiles of the profits 
of the naive investors strategies; the green box in the middle displays the 
40th to the 60th percentiles; and the top box displays the 60th to the 80th 
percentiles. The deviations of the momentum profits above the top 80th 
percentile of the profits of the naive investors strategies are in blue; and the 
deviations of the momentum profits below the bottom 20th percentile of the 
profits of the naive investors’ strategies are in red. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 6 
Panel A Hong Kong 
 
 
 
Panel B Korea 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Frequencies of momentum scores in Hong Kong and 
Korea. The distributions of 5 scores of the winner (1st column), 
the loser (2nd column) portfolios and the momentum profits (3rd 
column). The first and second rows in Panel A display the results for the 6 
by 6 momentum and the 3 by 3 momentum in Hong Kong, respectively. The 
first and second rows in Panel B display the results for the 6 by 6 
momentum and the 3 by 3 momentum in Korea, respectively. 
 
